How did the ‘democrats’ understand democracy? On the example of the formation of Moscow’s government
On the cover: first Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov at the rally
The current debate on the 90s is focused on questions of economic reform, while those regarding transformation of the political system have shifted to the periphery. It can seem as though on the political level there was an trivial transition, from the all-encompassing power of the totalitarian system of the CPSU to a democratic system based on the electivity principle and party pluralism. From this perspective, the subsequent development of the Russian political system looks like an authoritarian reversal, a failure of democratisation or a ‘betrayal’ of democracy.
However, with a more careful approach towards the political origins of the Russian 90s era, it can be noted that the aspirations of the "democrats" were by no means limited to the establishment of some generally accepted Western-type liberal constitutional regime. Their views and actions were formed in the context of an acute political struggle and often met its situational needs. The gradual concentration of power in the hands of the president and the administrative vertical largely continued the logic of this struggle and was the product of the political victories of the "democrats".
To reflect on possible scenarios for future democratisation in Russia, it would be useful to understand how reformers' ideas about the desired political structure were formed last time — during the construction of a ‘New Russia’ in 1990-1993. I will try to illuminate this issue using the example of the formation of city government in Moscow, which, to me, appears important for two reasons. Firstly, the Moscow city government was at the epicenter of events and was closely linked to key post-Soviet transformations. Secondly, these events set several all-Russian trends in terms of centralization of power and building an administrative vertical.
The first dual power in Moscow
In the spring of 1990, Moscow and Leningrad in the RSFSR held ‘overthrow elections’: candidates from the opposition bloc ‘Democratic Russia’ won a majority in the elections for the First Congress of People’s Deputies in the RSFSR, the Moscow City Council and the Leningrad City Council - the highest authorities of Russia (ie, the RSFSR) and its largest cities. Three leaders of the Group of Interregional Deputies were elected as heads of these bodies - Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak respectively. Yesterday’s persecuted oppositionists now occupied top political positions in the RSFSR, at national level and in that of its two ‘capitals’. In parallel, hundreds of their associates won local council elections.
The rejuvenated democratic Moscow City Council, chaired by Popov, was immediately confronted with the sad legacy of the previous government, finding itself in a situation of food crisis, strikes, grey market activity and economic sabotage of the nomenklatura. Popov managed to stabilize the situation and prevent the collapse of the new government thanks to Yuri Luzhkov - an experienced manager from the former Moscow City Executive Committee, whom he was able to drag into the team of reformers and put in charge with the help of Yeltsin.
However, Popov quickly understood that the Soviets, the highest authorities under the Constitution - were only a smokescreen for the real power of the CPSU and its apparatus. Formally, all power in Moscow is held by the Moscow City Council, district councils and their regional committees, in which reformers had a majority. But in parallel, a CPSU vertical existed within the city and district committees, which since the 1920s had managed all urban issues - from the appointment of managers to the distribution of housing and bonuses. For many officials, the instructions of the City Committee of the party were more important than instructions from Moscow City Council or the Moscow City Executive Committee, and the leaders of neighbouring regions would not send any meat or milk to Moscow without a call from the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU.
This dual power was unnoticeable while the Soviet organs were, by large, assembled by the party and subordinated to it. Now that politicians opposed to the leadership of the CPSU had been elected to the Soviets, the contradiction between two parallel power structures, dormant for 60 years, manifested itself. ‘Democrats’ came to power with the promise of reforms, but, as became apparent in practice, all the real administrative levers were within the party structures, which were reactionary-minded and often openly hostile to the reformers. This made the basic operational management of the urban economy difficult, and rendered the promised in-depth reforms completely impossible.
The political programme of the ‘Democrats’
In the midst of this situation, in the summer of 1990, Popov wrote a keynote article with the unassuming title ‘What is to be done?’ and the subtitle, ‘On the strategy and tactics of the democratic forces at the present stage’. In it, the chairman of the Moscow City Council analyses the first experience of the ‘democrats’ in power and formulates a democratic programme for completing perestroika. It consists of three focus areas: the transition to a market economy, the division of the Union into sovereign nation-states and the transition from the Soviet political system into the liberal republic. It is the last part that will interest us here.
For Popov, democratisation implies de-Sovietisation: ‘
Limitation of the power of the Soviets in general, focusing parliaments on legislation, the transformation of local Soviets from government bodies to local self-government bodies - ie, municipalities, and creation of an independent judicial system’. At first glance, this is the classic constitutional liberal idea about separating the branches of government and creating a system of checks and balances. However, Popov assigns a special role to the executive branch: ‘But most important, the main aspect is the election of executive authorities by direct vote at all levels; president, governors, mayors, elders - and the emergence of an executive branch independent from the Soviets in its composition.’
Let us note that the political programme of the democrats was not at all to introduce elections, as is often thought. As we have seen, elections to government bodies were already taking place by 1990. A distinctive feature of their programme was the direct election of executive leaders, which is not an intrinsic element of a liberal republic at all. For example, at that time there were no directly elected mayors in most European capitals (in London, such a position would only appear in 2000).
Popov’s argument for direct election of the executive branch was that the soviets were too weak to defeat the CPSU and dismantle the Soviet system itself. As he learned from his own experience, replacing communist deputies in the soviets from communists with democrats was not enough to carry out real reforms, and the deputies themselves were too connected with the old society:
‘When talking about the path towards limiting the power of the Soviets, we must not only bear in mind the general policy of de-Sovietisation. There is also the matter of the current composition of the Soviets. First of all, deputies, especially democrats, were not elected as representatives of any party, but as individuals. They are accountable to nobody except the voters. Counting on the sustainability of their actions in such a situation is difficult. And behind these deputies are not the forces of the new society, but the old social groups with their political positions. Deputies very often reflect what should not remain, what should change.’
From his point of view, the attachment of deputies to their constituents is problematic, because radical reforms in power do not require a representative cross-section of society, but a decisive politician, free to act and establish a new order atop a variety of opinions. Popov was annoyed by the incompetence of the huge Moscow City Council (and this is 465 deputies!), whose deputies could spend hours on beautiful speeches, when it was necessary not to speak, but to make decisions:
‘But as soon as something concrete must be decided, there arises a range of opinions from deputies, reflecting a range of opinions from current society and their ambiguous attitudes to the future. Endless debates arise, which cannot end in any way with the adoption of any constructive decisions.’
Popov emphasised that strong executive power was needed for a transitional period, which would last 2 to 3 years. He was aware that this proposal went badly with democratic ideas, but considered it a necessary measure for the transition to real democratic pluralism:
“The very nature of the system that is about to emerge immediately limits the possibilities of mass representative bodies and predetermines reliance on the executive power as the main instrument of transition from the old to the new [...] The main issue in political reform is the willingness of democrats to accept a number of restrictions on normal democracy [...] When different types of property, the market, new classes of society, their parties emerge, then the conditions will arise for the formation of a normal democratic mechanism.”
It’s hard not to notice how closely this resembles the future logic of the reforms of Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, who at that time were still far from power.
He is also aware of the risks of a split among the “democrats” on this issue:
“At the same time, the most difficult thing will be the adoption of this course by democracy. Some kind of split in its ranks cannot be ruled out.” And even more openly, in the reissue of the 1991 pamphlet: “Supporters of the democratic option - due to the nature of their mass base - gravitate towards populism, towards egalitarianism, towards justice. All this is not always combined with the market, with competition, with the strengthening of administrative power.”
Later in Popov’s writings, the thesis about strong executive power transforms from a transitional to an essential property of democracy as such: ‘In the Soviet system, the main element is the session of the Soviets. And in a democratic republic - the work of the apparatus. In the Soviet system, deputies should work, and in a democratic republic - professional officials’ (From the book ‘The First Mayor of Moscow’, 2015).
Thus, the idea of direct elections for heads of the executive branch, in the programme of the democratic forces, was dictated not only by general considerations of separation of power, but by the concrete needs of the political struggle. This meant the need to win in a situation of dual power between the Moscow City Council and the CPSU, which, from Popov’s point of view, could not be done by the Moscow City Council deputies themselves, due to their disorganisation and lack of consciousness.
The first dual power resolved: A mayor appears in Moscow
On 17th March 1991, two referendums took place in Russia; an all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR, and a republic-wide referendum on the introduction of the post of the President of the RSFSR. The fact is that Yeltsin, as Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, faced the same obstacles to reforms as Popov at the Moscow level. The solution to the problem, in the form of introducing a popularly elected president, which Popov had written about, suited Yeltsin, since his high level of direct popular support was clear from slogans in mass street demonstrations and all kinds of public debates. There was no doubt that, while shackled by the collegial Supreme Soviet and the huge Congress of People’s Deputies, Yeltsin would be able to win the presidential election and continue his policies separately from them - which is what happened.
Popov’s team in the Moscow City Council wanted to take advantage of the opportunities of the upcoming referendum and, on the same day, hold a vote on the introduction of the post of mayor of Moscow. They succeeded in scheduling such a vote, but not in the form of a referendum, but as a poll, which according to the law, was only for reference purposes. As a result, on 17th March 1991, Moscow residents received, in addition to two referendum ballots, a card with the question, ‘Do you consider it necessary to hold direct elections for Mayor of Moscow among city residents?’ In this poll, 81.1% of residents voted in favour, with a turnout of 67.6%.
It should be borne in mind here that the reformers carried out these decisive founding steps in the context of massive popular support, which was very visible on the streets in those months. On March 10, on the eve of the referendums, a legendary rally took place in Moscow on Manezhnaya Square, in which about half a million people participated. Then, on March 28, on the opening day of the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, which was to introduce the post of President of Russia, masses of demonstrators again gathered in the streets, despite the prohibitions of the Union authorities, who threatened dispersal and flooded the city center with troops. The slogans of these demonstrations simultaneously flooded newspapers and other publications. Reformers felt that the masses were expressing support for them in the fight against the CPSU and the nomenklatura, and perceived this as a mandate for political change. However, exactly what kind of reforms - this was not a question put to the voters.
In particular, what exactly did the position of mayor mean, the introduction of which Muscovites had voted for? There were no documents explaining the rights and duties of the future mayor and the coordination of his powers with those of the Moscow City Council. It was a "pig in a poke". These questions began to reveal themselves for the first time only a month after the survey. At the end of April, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR issued resolutions on the separation of executive and legislative powers in Moscow, which described the role of the mayor in the most general terms.
The first election of the mayor of Moscow was scheduled for the same day as the presidential election — June 12, 1991. Popov was nominated for the election, together with Luzhkov as vice-mayor. In the election program, they offered their vision of administrative reform for Moscow, including the separation of powers between the mayor and the Moscow City Council. In the elections in June, they won as expected, with 65.3% of the votes of Muscovites on a turnout of 66.48%. Their closest competitor received 16.3%, and the remaining candidates received less than 5%. Popov's team considered this an unequivocal endorsement of their political reform.
Now, let us look closely at this sequence of events. First, the idea arose of a strong executive power with direct popular legitimacy, bypassing the councils, something which the “democrats” needed to triumphantly overcome the situation of dual power with the CPSU. Popov passed through the Supreme Council of the RSFSR the decision to introduce the position of mayor, backing it up with a survey of citizens. The Supreme Council then outlined the most general contours of the mayor's powers and called mayoral elections. Only in the election program of the future mayor did more specific proposals appear on the role of the mayor and the division of powers. At this point, there was still no clear legislation regarding the mayor of Moscow. Thus, in both the March poll and the mayoral election in June, citizens were voting not for a concrete version of a political system with checks and balances, but for the abstract idea of a directly elected mayor with unknown powers.
Having assumed the position of mayor, Popov immediately began large-scale administrative reform. He divided the city into 10 administrative and 128 municipal districts, governed by prefects, and the sub-prefects he himself appointed. Next, he liquidated the Moscow City Executive Committee and district executive committees, depriving the Moscow City Council and district councils of executive power. This is how a new centralized government was established in Moscow, which, following the authorities, took over city enterprises and real estate.
The appearance of a strong mayor sharply exacerbated the situation of dual power with the CPSU, which would be resolved in August 1991 with the defeat of the GKChP coup. A desperate attempt by reactionary forces to reverse the processes of establishing a new government turned into a complete defeat for them: yesterday's owners of the city and the country were evacuated from the Central Committee building on the Old Square, the city committee and district committees; their seats were occupied by representatives of the mayor and the president. Later, Popov himself would explain the importance of his administrative reforms in this process:
"We have been criticized a lot for the restructuring of the Moscow apparatus. Now it became clear that our plan was correct. We managed to disorganize the district link oriented to the district committee of the CPSU. And the new structures — administrative districts and municipal districts — had no analogues (and, accordingly, "curators") in the party structure.”
The second dual power in Moscow
The triumphant victory over the CPSU at the end of August 1991 would provide the president and the mayor with carte blanche to continue the process of establishing a new system of government. Yeltsin issued decree after decree transferring powers to the mayor of Moscow. In other words, the question of the separation of powers, unwritten anywhere, resolved itself - the mayor got everything.
In autumn, the Moscow City Council tried to restore mayoral accountability and make the corrresponding decisions, but Mayor Popov did not comply with them. By the end of 1991, the Moscow City Council and the mayor were in open confrontation. In particular, when Popov decided to resign in 1992 and hand over the mayoral chair to Luzhkov, Moscow City Council would declare the transition illegal (as there really was no such provision in the law) and would try to schedule a rerun of the mayoral election. However, the president, using extraordinary powers, appointed Luzhkov mayor by decree, bypassing elections and the protests of the Moscow City Council.
This is how a second dual power arose — this time, between the new vertical of executive power, in the form of one elected person, on the one hand, and the old system of councils, consisting of hundreds of deputies at the Moscow level and thousands of deputies at the district level, on the other. In a few months, the same dual power would develop at the level of the RSFSR, where the Supreme Council would first voluntarily agree to the introduction of the post of a popularly elected president and give him extraordinary powers to carry out reforms, but then discover that the president would act independently of the council and claim supreme power in the country.
As is well known, this dual power would be resolved in October 1993 in a direct armed confrontation, from which the president and the mayor would emerge victorious. On October 7, Yeltsin, by decree, dissolved the Moscow City Council and all district councils, and called elections to the Moscow City Duma, a new city parliament, which would replace the Moscow City Council.
Here again, attention should be paid to the sequence of events. After the dissolution of the councils, the mayor received the full power of the city government in Moscow, there were simply no other city authorities. But on December 12, a national vote on the adoption of the constitution was scheduled, in which it was proposed that a new parliament, the Federal Assembly, should replace the dissolved Supreme Council, and the Moscow City Duma replace the Moscow City Council. Elections to these authorities were scheduled for the same day - elections to bodies which did not yet exist, which would emerge under the constitution, which had not yet been adopted. At the same time, the powers of the new Moscow City Duma were still unknown — they would have to be determined by the mayor before the City Duma adopted the city charter. Once again, we see the inverted logic of the establishment of power: first, a decision was made to change political institutions, then it was submitted for approval through a vote, and only after unequivocal approval were the powers of the new authorities determined.
The first convocation of the Moscow City Duma would consist of 35 deputies completely loyal to Mayor Luzhkov. The Moscow City Duma never entered into a serious conflict with the mayor and would approve all his decisions, up to his resignation in 2010. Luzhkov himself, in his first mayoral election in 1996, would receive 88.49% of the Muscovite vote with a turnout of 67.7%.
Some conclusions
From this cursory review of the history of the formation of the political system of post-Soviet Russia, I propose a few summarizing remarks.
The "democrat"-reformers formed specific ideas about the desired political structure of Russia not only from general ideas about what democracy is, but also from the tactical needs of political struggle. In particular, the idea of a strong executive power seemed to them like a tool of struggle in the conditions of two dual power situations. At first, they considered it a temporary means for a transitional period, but as a result of the victory in political confrontations and the establishment of new political institutions, this idea became entrenched in their views about the essence of democracy. By 1993, they were already openly insisting that the omnipotence of a president or mayor who was elected by an overwhelming majority of voting citizens, was democracy.
Political reform programmes are highly susceptible to the tactical needs of political confrontations, which reduces the value of their a priori development. At the start of the political struggle, on the eve of the 1990 elections, "democrats" of various kinds had many political programs, but they all turned out to be irrelevant and had no influence. The system of power established by the end of 1993 in post-Soviet Russia was hardly the embodiment of anyone's programme, but rather the product of a series of tactical decisions.
In this case, it is not specific political reform programmes which were authorised, but politicians, who then determined the design of the political system they needed themselves. The breakthrough in the 1990 elections and the establishment of the positions of president and mayor in 1991 would have been impossible without the record-breaking rallies in Moscow, which sowed doubts in pro-communist strata and allowed the ‘democrats’ to establish a new supreme power. However, neither at the rallies, nor at the various votes, did citizens choose a specific political system - it was established after the legitimation of the new government.
Some conclusions can also be drawn for discussions about how the Russian people can make the most of their next historic chance for democratization. We should not rely on the fact that humanity already knows the good institutional design of a democratic political system, which only requires good politicians and experts to implement it. In reality, the political system will take shape in the course of political struggle. Its configuration will depend on the balance of forces in this struggle. Only those who intend on equality and freedom can establish a decentralized system of power based on this broad political equality and freedom. But for this, they need to successfully fight for power.